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How is AMERICA "DIVIDED BY GOD"?
Steven D. Smith*
Professor Modak-Truran's admirable prospectus for this discussion1
asserts that Americans are fundamentally divided over the proper relation
between government and religion, and that this division manifests itself in
increasingly acrimonious disputes over things such as public religious sym-
bols and the teaching of intelligent design in public schools. It seems to me
that he is right about this. Professor Modak-Truran also suggests that these
differences are unlikely to be resolved by straightforward appeals to con-
stitutional history or precedent, so that as scholars we would do well to go
deeper and try to understand the underlying differences in presuppositions
about religion, law, and pluralism. Again, it seems to me that he is right.2
But what are the fundamental underlying differences in presupposi-
tions that surface in more concrete controversies over crosses and curricu-
lum and the like? Where exactly does the fault line lie, so to speak? That
is a very hard and complicated question, and any answer will inevitably
simplify. Or at least mine will, egregiously. But with that caveat, I want to
suggest that perhaps the most illuminating answer is suggested very early
on in an important recent book by Noah Feldman.3 Though I happen to
disagree with some of what comes later in the book, I think Noah's title
gets it right: Americans are "divided by God."
But in what way? The question points us to some formidable com-
plexities. So in this essay, I want to try to explain, still in a very broad
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry Alexander
and John Evans for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This paper was originally presented at the
AALS panel of the Law and Religion section in January 2007.
1. Dr. Mark Modak-Truran, Religion, Religious Pluralism, and the Rule of Law, 27 Miss. C. L.
REV. 1 (2008). Current debates about the relationship between law and religion are dominated by two
camps-religionists and separationists. In the words of Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952), religionists maintain that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being." Id. While still maintaining a limited notion of separation of church and state, religion-
ists tend to support posting the Ten Commandments, displaying creches, keeping "under God" in the
pledge of allegiance, citing scripture in judicial opinions, and allowing prayer and the teaching of intelli-
gent design in public schools. In contrast, separationists generally regard these practices as Establish-
ment Clause violations that fail to reflect the religiously plural character of American society. Both
sides have used historical and doctrinal arguments to support their views, but these arguments have
been inconclusive. Indeed, it seems likely that neither history nor precedent can settle the disagree-
ments between religionists and separationists. Perhaps their differences rest on more fundamental dis-
agreements regarding their conceptions of religion, religious pluralism, and the nature and rule of law.
What are these presuppositions and where do they come from? Are the presuppositions of religionists
and separationists reasonable or justifiable? Are there other possible positions based on different un-
derstandings of religion, religious pluralism, and the rule of law? How do conceptions of religion,
religious pluralism, and law shape our thinking about the proper role of religion in a pluralistic demo-
cratic society?
2. I have argued to the same effect in Steven D. Smith, The Iceberg of Religious Freedom: Sub-
Surface Levels of Nonestablishment Discourse, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 799 (2005).
3. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD (2005).
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brush way, and indulging in some amateur theology and armchair sociol-
ogy, how basic differences about God might animate the political and legal
controversies that we have been observing.
I. DIFFERING ABOUT DEITY
A. To Believe or Not to Believe: Is that the Question?
When asked, some Americans say they do and others say they do not
believe in God. It seems that about ninety percent of Americans, give or
take a few percentage points, usually answer this question "yes," while
about ten percent give a more negative response. These results suggest a
difference in belief that, at least in the abstract, might conceivably have
significant implications for other kinds of concerns, including the legal and
political controversies we have alluded to. So, have we located here the
cultural fault line that explains the divisions we are discussing?
Probably not. If the situation were this simple, then we might expect
that something like ninety percent of the population would come down on
what we might call the "pro-religion" side of church-state controversies:
the overwhelming majority would favor the maintenance of public religious
symbols and the extension of aid to religious schools and so forth. And the
fact that the courts often come down on the other, more "secular" side
would then presumably need to be viewed as a case of a secular elite im-
posing its views on a religious citizenry.
That description is sometimes offered-Peter Berger has described the
U.S. as a nation of Indians governed by Swedes-and I believe that it con-
tains a large measure of truth. Still, the reality is plainly more complex.
The country's cultural elite is far from being uniformly non-religious or
anti-religious. And we regularly observe clergy, or scholars who are per-
sonally religious, taking the "secular" view and chastising the "pro-relig-
ion" side on such matters.4
One difficulty with the "believer/nonbeliever" depiction is that it
presents belief in God as an either/or proposition, and thus fails to ac-
knowledge the uncertainty that besets many believers and nonbelievers.
Rather than a world containing some people who unqualifiedly believe in
God and others who categorically do not, the reality is probably more like
a spectrum that ranges from those whose faith is firm and unwavering, to
people who hold theistic beliefs somewhat more tentatively, to people who
describe themselves as agnostics, to the hard-core atheists wholly un-
troubled by theistic doubts. Even the "spectrum" metaphor oversimplifies,
I believe, but it will have to do for now.5
4. See, e.g., MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL (2005); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, The
Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic, in Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought 73, 90-91 (Michael
McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
5. See Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, (forthcoming). In this work-in-progress, I
try to describe the phenomenon more in terms of the "layered" structure of human cognitive life-we
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And of course, even the most devoted residents of a creedal neighbor-
hood will sometimes relocate. It seems that there are always people who
are losing their faith, which is what gives the slogan "Keep the Faith" its
point. And movement can run the other way.6 When I was an undergradu-
ate, Antony Flew (affectionately referred to as "the Oxford Flew") ap-
peared in the books as an aggressively articulate atheist; now, it seems, he
believes in God.7 Who knows? Maybe the same will happen to Daniel
Dennett, or Richard Dawkins, or Chistopher Hitchens (I'm not counting
on it, though-not in this life anyway).
Another complication is that language can be murky and misleading,
especially in matters of religion. On the specific issue of God, even de-
voutly religious thinkers have often insisted that human language not only
may but must be allusive, figurative, analogical, or purely negative.8 And
the consequent obscurity is aggravated by the fact that people may have
personal or cultural or political motives to obfuscate. Consequently, when
someone says he believes in God (or does not), it is not always easy to tell
just what is meant: you want to ask, "Yes, of course, fine-but what do you
really believe?More generally, answers to the pollster-type question "Do
you believe in God?" only even purport to reveal something on the level of
intellectual assent to a fairly abstract proposition. But this sort of proposi-
tional assent is only part of-and arguably not the most important part of -
what causes people to speak and act as they do, even in controversies to
which the intellectual proposition seems potentially relevant. So we need
to consider other dimensions of what believing (or not believing) in God
entails.
B. Which God?
For one thing, we need to notice important differences in the more
concrete content of the assertion that God exists. Obviously, Americans
(and human beings generally) who profess theistic beliefs understand God
in a vast variety of ways. But, still simplifying, I think we can discern an
important divide between what we can call detached and engaged deities.
On the one hand, there are those who believe in some sort of distant, de-
tached, largely passive or disengaged being-an unmoved mover, or a deis-
tic watchmaker who made and wound up the universe and then left it to
have beliefs, and beliefs about beliefs, and beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, and so on. So it is possi-
ble on one level to believe X, while on another level doubting that one has adequate justification for
believing in X, and so forth.
6. See generally ALISTER McGRATH, THE TWILIGHT OF ATHEISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF DIS-
BELIEF IN THE MODERN WORLD (2004).
7. See Interview by Dr. Gary R. Habermas with Antony Flew, Professor of Philosophy, availa-
ble at http://www.biola.edu/antonyflew/.
8. See WILLIAM C. PLACHER, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 95, 154-55 (1983).
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run on its own.9 Or they may believe in God as a sort of personified ex-
pression of something inside us-our "power of being," perhaps."0 On the
other hand, some religionists believe in a more personal, active, engaged
God who takes an ongoing interest and plays an important ongoing role in
His creation-in something like the God of the Hebrew scriptures that
Christians call the Old Testament.
The connection between these conceptions of deity is complicated, and
I will not be discussing that connection here. For present purposes, the
important point is that though both sorts of believers might be called "re-
ligious," and thus might be lumped together under the heading of "theists,"
or "believers," for many practical purposes the believers in an abstract,
detached deity may have more in common with the atheists and agnostics
than with the believers in the more biblical God who remains interested
and engaged in our affairs. Although a detached deity may be of use in
addressing certain philosophical questions-questions most people rarely if
ever trouble themselves to ask (such as "Why is there something rather
than nothing?")-he (or more aptly it) seems pretty much irrelevant to al-
most all practical concerns. One would feel foolish praying to, or singing
to, or praising that sort of deity (who by hypothesis would not notice any-
way). And there would be no point whatsoever in invoking its aid with
respect to personal or public concerns: that is just not the sort of business
that the philosophers' god is in. So even if such a deity exists, so that those
who deny its existence are mistaken, for most practical human purposes it
might as well not exist."1
Conversely, the more biblical God has a different character and calls
for a very different attitude and response. That God, as Creator and su-
preme Governor of the world (including the human world, both public and
private), would be the ultimate basis of things like law, and human dignity,
and hence human rights, so that a failure to understand that connection
would likely lead to a breakdown in understanding in these important mat-
ters as well. He (or, if you prefer, She) might exhibit personal qualities
such as (in mundane human terms) benevolence or, conversely, wrath. Al-
though the cultured seem to find the notion shocking, He might actually
play some sort of causal role in mundane human events-and not only the
9. One recent study describes Americans as holding four main conceptions of deity, labeled by
the researchers as the "authoritarian God," the "benevolent God," the "critical God," and the "distant
God." Proponents of the last of these conceptions "tend towards thinking about god as a cosmic force
which set the laws of nature in motion. As such, God does not 'do' things in the world and does not
hold clear opinions about our activities or world events." American Piety in the 21st Century: New
Insights into the Depth and Complexity of Religion in the US, 2006 BAYLOR INST. FOR STUD. OF RELIG-
ION 1, 26-27 (2006).
10. Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965) (quoting PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THE-
OLOGY 12 (1957)).
11. Cf CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS OF MODEaNIT' 41-42 (1996) ("God is so great he
does not have to exist .... It was thus God's fate, slowly worked out through the centuries, to be freed
from the human tasks of this world .... God's transcendence has led to his withdrawal from the world
and thus to the autonomy of the world.").
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happy ones but the tragic ones as well. 12 If this God guides and governs
the affairs not only of individuals but of nations, and if He is responsive to
human conduct and supplication (as the God presented in the Bible surely
is), then it might follow that (to quote George Washington) "it is the duty
of all nations"-notice that the duty applies to nations, not just to private
individuals-Ato acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey
His will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protec-
tion and favor .... " or (to quote Washington's successor, John Adams)
that "the safety and prosperity of nations ultimately and essentially depend
on the protection and the blessing of Almighty God, and the national ac-
knowledgment of this truth is ... an indispensable duty
which the people owe to Him ... "13
A sociologist friend who studies American attitudes towards religion
tells me that I am mistaken in supposing that more than a few Americans
actually believe in this sort of God who desires or deserves public acknowl-
edgment and worship. He may be right. Maybe my contrary view is just
based on my own beliefs and those of people I associate with in a religious
context. I suspect that if you watch the 700 Club you would hear this sort
of view expressed, but I admit that I have almost never watched the 700
Club, so I cannot be sure.
In any case, in noticing these differences in the conceptions of deity
that even theists or believers hold, I think we come closer to perceiving the
cultural divide that drives church-state disagreements. But we need to no-
tice one further dimension of the divide that "belief in God" reflects.
C. Existential Urgency
Differences in conceptions of God are related but not identical, I
think, to another important but elusive difference that I will call, with apol-
ogies, existential urgency.' 4 The dimension of belief I am trying to allude
to here has to do with how important or present or central a belief is in the
believer's cognitive and active life. A belief might be wholly sincere and
yet profoundly unimportant even to the believer. I might assent to the
proposition that "God exists@ in the same way that I assent to, say, the
proposition that "Twelve is the square root of 144." I do not doubt, nor do
I care about, the mathematical assertion: it does not figure in my thoughts,
and if someday it turns out that the square root of 144 is actually eleven, or
thirteen, I will not mourn even for a moment. I might believe-or disbe-
lieve-in God in approximately the same way.
12. See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING
OF A NATION 234-36 (2006) (discussing how the suggestion by some prominent religious figures that the
September 11, 2001 tragedy might have reflected divine retribution, though entirely congruent with an
Old Testament worldview, was met with shock or disdain in some quarters).
13. Reprinted in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM 202-03 (2001).
14. For a more detailed discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings:
the Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1268-81.
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Or my belief might be something that matters to me profoundly: I
think about the question often and feelingly, perhaps, and it seems to me of
utmost importance that I get the belief right. Perhaps the belief plays a
central and active role in my thinking on other matters, and in my reason-
ing about how to live. Indeed, I might find talk about "belief in God" to be
misleading from the outset: God is not a proposition that one believes or
disbelieves, but rather a Person whom one accepts and embraces or else
rejects; and if one accepts God then God becomes central to one's life in all
its aspects.
One would suppose that there should be-and perhaps there is-a
correlation between the substantive content of a theistic proposition and
the existential urgency that the proposition generates. If one conceives of
god as the detached deity who plays no ongoing role in the world and who
is largely irrelevant to practical concerns, then there would seem to be little
reason to attach much importance to that belief (or lack thereof); and con-
versely, if one conceives of God as the active biblical God, then there is
much more cause to care about that belief, or that Being. Or so it would
seem. Still, humans are complicated creatures, capable of defying this sort
of mundane correlation. So it seems at least possible-and I suspect it is
common-for people to affirm belief in the biblical God without feeling
much urgency in connection with the belief. "Do I believe in the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob? Sure. And so.... what's on TV tonight?@
Conversely, someone might become occupied to the point of obsession
with philosophical questions about the existence of god: people have fix-
ated on matters far more trivial than this.
It is important to note, I think, that both theists and non-theists experi-
ence degrees of existential urgency in the matter of theistic belief. On the
non-believing side, there are no doubt many who, while doubting the exis-
tence of god, shrug off the question. "Who cares? Does it really make any
difference?"
But others take the matter very seriously. It is not just that God does
not happen to exist; rather, it is important, and greatly to be desired (as
Thomas Nagel suggests 15), that He does not exist. Though there is no God,
He nonetheless (or would it be therefore?) needs to be actively, aggres-
sively combated.' 6 James Wood presents such a character, Thomas Bunt-
ing, in his novel The Book Against God, 7 and Bunting evidently reflects
Woods's own considered view. Thus, Wood explains that
15. THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD 130 (1997) (describing "a fear of religion which has large
and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life"). He writes: I speak from experience,
being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that
some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I
don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I
don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.
16. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERY-
THING (2007).
17. JAMES WOOD, THE BOOK AGAINST GOD (2003).
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[t]he child of evangelicalism, if he does not believe, inherits
nevertheless a suspicion of indifference. He is always evan-
gelical. He rejects the religion he grew up with, but he re-
jects it religiously. He has buried evangelical belief but he
has not buried the evangelical choice, which seems to him
the only important dilemma. He respects the logical claus-
trophobia of Christian commitment, the little cell of belief.
This is the only kind of belief that make sense, the revolu-
tionary kind. Nominal belief is insufficiently serious; nomi-
nal unbelief seems almost a blasphemy against earnest
atheism.
18
And of course there are those-the Madalyn Murray O'Hairs and the
Michael Newdows of the world-who do not believe in God and who
devote themselves to combating Him in the courts.1 9
D. Secularists and Strong Religionists
So there are various shades and dimensions not readily measurable in
surveys (including dimensions I have not mentioned here) to the matter of
what we palely describe as "believing (or not believing) in God." Ac-
knowledging these complexities, it will be helpful to try to divide our sub-
jects into two camps-admittedly rough and shifting camps. One camp we
might describe as including the "secularists." This camp would encompass
atheists and agnostics, of course, of both the combative and the more com-
placent varieties. But the secularist camp would also include religious be-
lievers-millions of them, probably-who are theists but who effectively
believe in a more detached or passive deity. And it would contain as well
religious believers-millions more, possibly-for whom their beliefs, while
not insincere, do not hold any great existential urgency for the believers
themselves. It will be helpful to have a label for these devotees of what
Alan Wolfe calls "God Lite,"2 ° and I do not want a label that is too pejora-
tive (like "weak" or "lukewarm" or "wishy-washy"21 ): so let us call them
"tame religionists."
Borrowing from another book title, we might describe the opposing
camp as "strong religionists."2 The book itself is about so-called "funda-
mentalists," and many fundamentalists would no doubt congregate in this
camp, but I think it is a common mistake of the cultured despisers simply to
equate strong religionists with fundamentalists. The camp would include all
18. JAMES WOOD, THE BROKEN ESTATE 265 (1999).
19. See, e.g., Elk Grove School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
20. ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION 156 (2003).
21. Cf Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending
the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56, 61-63 (1998) (suggesting that liberalism
should cultivate "wishy-washy" religion).
22. GABRIEL A. ALMOND, R. ScoTr APPLEBY & EMMANUEL SIVAN, STRONG RELIGION: THE
RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD (2003).
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of those (whether or not of fundamentalist convictions) who not only be-
lieve in God, but who believe in an active, engaged, sort of deity, and for
whom this belief is important and plays a large role in their cognitive and
active life.
My sense is that this description of "secularists" and "strong believers"
comes close to capturing the underlying cultural division that animates
American church-state controversies. But before proceeding to explain
why this seems to be so, I need to note two further complications: each
reflects a factor that can make for considerable fluidity between the camps.
The first complication is that many religious people are not in practice
strong religionists, not consistently anyway; but they may aspire to be-at
least intermittently and half-heartedly. They go to church, perhaps, and
hear a sermon about how God should be central in their lives; and, reflect-
ing on the general pointlessness of their existence, they nod in agreement
and resolve to be more religiously committed. Then they go home and
promptly become absorbed in the football game and forget their resolve;
but the next week they hear another homily and reflect again and their
resolve is renewed. I do not mean to be condescending toward this type of
character; in fact, I have self-serving reasons to be entirely sympathetic. I
suspect that the life of sincere but not saintly religious believers is typically
a long struggle to live more in accordance with the strong implications of
their belief; and some believers struggle more successfully than others. But
in any case, the consequence is that a believer may be, by and large and for
most practical purposes, in the secularist camp, but she may nonetheless
sympathize with, or occasionally hang out in, the camp of strong religion.
Different situations can provoke one or the other allegiance.
The second complication is that Bible-oriented theists, and Christians
in particular, are heirs to a long, paradoxical tradition that we might de-
scribe as dualistically monistic, or monistically dualistic. There is one God
(even if a three-person God), who is the Creator and Governor of all
things23 ; so all spheres of life and the world are subject to Him. But...
God Himself has ordained that some spheres of life should enjoy a sort of
qualified autonomy. So there are two swords, two kingdoms, the church
and the world, the spiritual and the temporal-things that are God's and
things that are Caesar's24 (though Caesar himself is God's)." Just how to
work out the jurisdictional lines is a complicated problem, as is the connec-
tion between the jurisdictions. Is the relationship of spiritual and temporal
one of continuity, divine grace perfecting nature? Or of radical discontinu-




26. For a deservedly celebrated treatment of the range of approaches to this question, see H.
RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951).
[VOL. 27:141
HOW IS AMERICA "DIVIDED BY GOD"?
Believers have struggled with these questions, 27 but at least one famil-
iar interpretation may lead a believer (Roger Williams is perhaps the clas-
sic instance in our own history28) to affirm the existence of a secular realm
not under the jurisdiction of the church or of revealed truth. In this way,
even the strong believer may ally for many practical purposes with the sec-
ular camp. But her reasons for affirming the independence of the secular
are religious reasons, and hence her construction of the secular domain is
likely to differ at some points.
Recognizing these qualifications and complications, I want to suggest
that this description of our culture as divided between "secularists" and
"strong religionists" is nonetheless useful in understanding the landscape of
church-state disputes today.
II. THE CULTURAL DIVIDE
A. The Overlapping Consensus in Favor of Secular Government
One benefit of this description, I believe, is that it helps explain the
ease with which a "secularity" requirement has been embraced in our con-
stitutional doctrine. That doctrine requires, of course, that any law or gov-
ernmental action must have a "secular" purpose and a primarily "secular"
effect. Although church-state cases have historically provoked disagree-
ment and vigorous dissent on the Court, this secularity requirement seems
to have been accepted-indeed, taken to be virtually axiomatic-by every-
one on the Court: it was after all Chief Justice Burger (hardly a champion
of secular progressivism) who codified the secularity requirement in consti-
tutional doctrine.2 9 Nor does the requirement seem to provoke serious op-
position even from organizations and litigators who champion religious
causes; they typically argue (under constraint, to be sure) not that govern-
ment should not be limited to the secular, but rather that their favored
measures or causes are secular.3 °
This complacent consensus in favor of a secularity requirement might
seem surprising, even extraordinary. After all, the text of the First Amend-
ment does not impose any such requirement-not explicitly, surely: the
27. At least until relatively recently, this problem of the spiritual and the temporal was the cen-
tral problem that animated the sorts of controversies that we associate with the problems of church and
state or of religious freedom. Only recently, I believe, did it come to seem that the central problem is
that of how to deal with religion, or religious pluralism, in a presumptively secular polity.
28. For a perceptive study portraying the ways in which Williams was both devoutly and even
fanatically "religious" and at the same time resolutely committed to a "secular" sphere, see TIMOTHY
HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998).
29. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30. Though this sort of argument is often regarded as disingenuous, or as demeaning to religion,
it need not be. "Secular" can mean different things, and one familiar meaning is something like "of and
pertaining to this world." In this sense, something can easily be both "religious" and "secular": note
the standard description of priests who work in a parish rather than retreating to a monastery as the
"secular clergy." In using the notion of "secular" in this more affirmative sense, however, advocates are
swimming against the current of modern legal usage of the term. See generally, Steven D. Smith,
Nonestablishment "Under God"? The Nonsectarian Principle, The Donald A. Gianella Memorial Lec-
ture, in 50 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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widespread assumption that the text must mean something like "secular
government" represents a failure of historical imagination that leads many
to read back into the founding the assumptions of today.3 The leaders of
the founding generation (men like Jefferson and Madison) are sometimes
described as having been "secular," and they were-but not in anything
like the typical modern sense of the term.32 As Daniel Boorstin's book on
the subject amply demonstrates, their worldview was deeply and essentially
theistic.33 Throughout American history, religion and government have
been profoundly intertwined, in complicated ways.34 And as noted, about
ninety percent of Americans today report that they believe in God. Even
in a context in which constitutional doctrine is routinely disparaged, and in
which intelligent though perhaps skewed and slightly paranoid observers
are always discerning signs of an incipient theocracy, I perceive little ef-
fort directly to challenge the specific constitutional requirement that gov-
ernment confine itself to the "secular." So, how is this easy acceptance of
"secular" government to be explained?
In part the answer is that "secular" means different things to different
people,36 so nearly everyone can agree that government should be "secu-
lar" in some sense. But I think the earlier description of America as di-
vided between "secularists" and "strong believers" can also be illuminating
here. Thus, one would expect atheists and agnostics to favor maintaining a
secular public sphere, and presumably they do. But many religionists do as
well. This group would include those tame religionists whose god is the
detached deity irrelevant to practical concerns (and therefore of no rele-
vance to the practical concerns of politics and government) or who believe
in a biblical God but feel no real urgency or existential commitment. In
addition, even the Roger Williams-type strong believers whose "two king-
doms" conception is one of marked discontinuity between realms may
favor a secular public sphere. All in all, these groups apparently add up to
a large majority that embraces (though subject to significantly different in-
terpretations, to be sure) the idea of a secular public sphere.
31. I have argued for this position at greater length elsewhere. See Steven D. Smith, Separation
and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989).
32. The historian Sidney Mead observes that "most of the men who had a hand in framing the
Declaration and the Constitution in launching the new government@ acted on the basis of a sort of
Atheology of the Republic." This theology was not "distinctively Protestant or even Christian." At the
same time, "those who try to make secularistsBin the classical senseBout of [the framers] are just as
wrong" as those who argue for a Protestant or Christian founding. SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE NATION
WITH THE SOUL OF A CHURCH 18-21 (1975). For a recent, fair-minded overview of the founders' religi-
osity, see DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2006).
33. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1948). See also HENRY F.
MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); Holmes, supra note 32, at 163 (commenting that al-
though many of the country's founders were more deists than orthodox Christians, and although their
beliefs were diverse, nonetheless "the founding generation held certain convictions in common. Most
believed in a guiding Providence and in a life after death. These affirmations separated them from the
radical Deists of their time."
34. See Michael E. Smith, Religious Activism: The Historical Record, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1087 (1986).
35. See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY (2006).
36. See Smith, supra note 30.
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Consensus, of course, is not unanimity: some people-lots of them,
probably-are excluded. This observation leads to the next major area in
which the "secularist/strong religionist" depiction may be useful.
B. Worlds Colliding? Ships Passing?
Although the consensus favoring secular government includes even
some "strong religionists," it excludes others; and even those who can en-
dorse the idea may be apprehensive, because the secular sphere that they
endorse may in significant respects be different from the one that nonbe-
lievers and more tame believers favor. Though their practical conclusions
may often converge, at bottom the relation between strong believers and
secularists is one of, to borrow from the title of still another valuable book
on the subject, "worlds colliding."37 The God-centered worldview is just
radically different from the worldview in which "God Lite" is either absent
or peripheral, and it would be remarkable if this radical difference did not
have implications for some of the issues that arise in law and politics-
including some of the issues mentioned in Professor Modak-Truran's
prospectus.
Thus, in a recent article in the Boston Globe, Cathy Young observes
that "[b]ehind the political divide in America, there is also a religious di-
vide. The split is not just between people who believe and people who do
not; it is between those who see religious faith as society's foundation."38
James Davison Hunter agrees:
Partisans on each side ... operate with distinct and funda-
mentally different understandings of the moral life and
moral authority ... While both factions strongly affirm the
ideals of the American democratic tradition, they under-
stand this tradition differently; at points they are at odds in
their understanding of American history and purpose, and
work with different interpretations of the American creed.39
I will discuss in a moment how these differences may affect the issue of
publicly sponsored religious symbols and expressions. In general, though,
strong religionists' understanding of the world, including the political
world, will operate within a religious framework, and so it will seem natural
to them that religious assumptions will play a role in politics. How could it
be otherwise? Theistic belief and commitment are central to their own
identity and their whole framework for understanding the world. So they
will interpret American history within a religious framework, perhaps like
37. REX J. AHDAR, WORLDS COLLIDING: CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS AND THE LAW (2001).
38. Cathy Young, The Religious Divide, BOSTON GLOBE, November 20, 2006, available at http://
www.bostonglobe.comlnewslglobeleditorial-opinionloped/articles/2006/11/20/the-religious-divide.
39. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, Is THERE A CULTURE WAR? A DIALOGUE ON
VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 25 (2006).
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the one described in Robert Bellah's accounts of American civil religion.4 °
On strong religious assumptions it is likely to seem not merely permissible
but imperative-and for a people as well as for individual persons-to ac-
knowledge God's sovereignty over all things, including the public sphere.41
But it is also crucial to emphasize some features and implications that
strong religion does not have-not necessarily, anyway. As noted, strong
religionists need not be fundamentalists; they need not believe in, for ex-
ample, an inerrant and literal understanding of scripture. So it is simply
false to assume, as their critics so often do, that religious believers in "crea-
tionism" or "intelligent design" are necessarily fundamentalists or biblical
literalists. Strong religion also need not be intolerant,42 or theocratic. On
the contrary, religion as it has evolved in Western history typically has
within itself the resources to argue in favor of things such as human equal-
ity,43 human rights,44 republican democracy, 45 religious liberty, and free-
dom of conscience.46 As a historical matter, those commitments evolved
out of religious beliefs and commitments, and it is not at all clear that secu-
lar perspectives can do as well in justifying them.47 And, as noted, most
religious traditions in the West have some sort of dualistic, spiritual-tempo-
ral or two-kingdoms commitment that works against theocracy.
These aspects of strong religion appear to be almost invisible or in-
comprehensible to many in the secularist camp. From that side of the di-
vide we regularly see depictions that equate strong religion with
fundamentalism, and intolerance, and theocracy.48 Strong religionists, in
this perspective, are people who insist on gratuitously inserting their relig-
ion into a domain where it does not belong, or on using politics to impose
their beliefs on others-to make everybody conform to their own religious
beliefs and commitments.49
40. See ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF
TRIAL (2d ed. 1975).
41. See Noonan et. al., supra note 13.
42. See generally Steven D. Smith, Toleration and Liberal Commitments (forthcoming); CHRIS-
TIAN SMITH, CHRISTIAN AMERICA? WHAT EVANGELICALS REALLY WANT (2000).
43. See JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY (2002); George Fletcher, In God's
Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L. Rev 1608 (1999); Louis Pojman,
On Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism, in EQUALITY: SELECTED READ-
INGS 295 (Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland eds., 1997).
44. See DOES HUMAN RIGHTS NEED GOD? (Elizabeth M. Bucar & Barbra Barnett eds. 2005);
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998).
45. MARK NOLL, AMERICA'S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005).
46. See Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 910 (2005).
47. See POJMAN, supra note 43 (on the difficulty of justifying equality on secular grounds); WAL-
DRON, supra note 43 (on the difficulty of justifying equality on secular grounds); PERRY, supra note 44
(on rights); Smith, supra note 46 (on freedom of conscience); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1419 (1991) (on religious liberty).
48. See PHILLIPS, supra note 35; HITCHENS, supra note 16.
49. There is a truistic sense, of course, in which insofar as their political decisions are based on
their beliefs, which are at least partly religious in character, religionists do attempt to impose their
beliefs on others-as everyone else does who makes political decisions on the basis of what he or she
believes. What else would we do? (Other than, perhaps, simply set beliefs aside and act on the basis of
something else, like self-interest.).
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The depiction of the cultural divide I have offered helps explain these
perceptions, I think. It is hardly surprising that people entrenched in one
worldview would have difficulty understanding those in another worldview:
this is a standard challenge for anthropologists, for example. But the prob-
lem may be aggravated in this case by the fact that the secularists may
understand religion, or think they understand it, by reference to the sort of
more domesticated religion that they are familiar with in their close associ-
ates, or in themselves."
These sorts of tamely respectable believers may have little reason, to
be sure, to import their religious beliefs into politics or law in any conspicu-
ous way; or if they did for some reason do so, this would seem to be a
gratuitous and misguided intrusion of "religion" into a domain where it
simply has no place. And perhaps a secular public sphere is by and large
respectful of-or, if you like, neutral toward-that type of religion. So if
this sort of domesticated religion gives us our template, then strong reli-
gionists may appear to be like the tame religionists we know and work with
in the fact of being "religious"; they differ from our religious colleagues (or
ourselves) only in being intolerant, militant, disrespectful of the benign sec-
ular neutrality that, if everyone would just be "reasonable," ought to be
satisfactory to religious and nonreligious citizens alike. What is their prob-
lem? Why can't they just get along?
But the term "religion" misleads us here, I think. As noted, there is a
large gulf dividing the tame from the strong religionists (even though, as
also noted, many believers may vacillate about which side of the gulf they
should make their domicile on). And however hard it may be for the cul-
tured secularists to fully grasp this fact, the secular neutrality mandated
(albeit erratically) by current constitutional doctrine does indeed on a fun-
damental level reject and encroach on the position of many strong
religionists. 1
C. The Significance of Symbols
Of the current controversies mentioned in Professor Modak-Truran's
prospectus, most of them involve arguably religious symbols or expressions
by government-creches, Ten Commandments monuments, the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance and the like. Again, I think the
prospectus is accurate in this respect-these are the contentious issues of
50. Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation
Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1078-79 (1996). Douglas Laycock's obser-
vations are revealing. "I have heard several colleagues say that religious claims are absurd, ridiculous,
irrational, or unworthy of respect," Laycock reports. "I have never heard a colleague, at any of the
three law schools where I have taught, make a religious claim in an academic context. When the stu-
dent chapter of the Christian Legal Society at The University of Texas needed a speaker, I knew of only
three or four church-attending colleagues on a faculty of sixty-five, none in the evangelical mode the
students were seeking." But Laycock also points to contrary evidence: "James Lindgren has survey
data showing that a substantial majority of law professors profess conventional Christian or Jewish
religious views. These numbers are much higher than either he or I would have guessed based on
personal experience in several law schools." Id.
51. See ADHAR, supra note 37 at 75-106.
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our time-but the fact is nonetheless significant and, from one perspective,
surprising. If we were to go back even thirty years, say, things would look
different: the active controversies would be mostly about more tangible
matters-in particular, money. But although public aid to religious schools
or other institutions continues to provoke controversy and litigation, that
sort of controversy seems to have receded somewhat in recent years: to the
puzzlement and frequent annoyance of more hard-headed critics, the most
active cultural passions today seem to be aroused by questions of symbol-
ism and expression.
Once again, I think the "secularists/strong religionists" depiction of the
cultural divide helps to explain this development. To be candid (if peremp-
tory), the Everson-style argument that the First Amendment was adopted
to categorically prohibit any sort of financial aid to religious institutions is
just not very plausible.52 We can of course read the Constitution to do that
if it seems like a good idea, but is it a good idea? The overlapping consen-
sus in which tame religionists can join with atheists and agnostics to en-
dorse a secular public sphere does not obviously mandate the exclusion of
religious institutions from secular programs so long as those institutions do
in fact provide a secular service and participate on equal terms with non-
religious institutions.53
Conversely, when the question involves religious symbolism or expres-
sion rather than money or coercion, the tension with the secularity require-
ment is more conspicuous. But at the same time, in these situations a
different (though unstable) sort of consensus may emerge in support of
such expression.
Here again, my description will simplify significantly. But it seems
that many strong religionists will think that it is not only permissible but
imperative for the community to acknowledge its dependence as a commu-
nity on God. In the founding period this view was often expressed even by
those whose religion was less than fervent, and it is not surprising that the
view persists among many believers. And though here opinions surely
vary, even strong religionists in the Roger Williams tradition might still
favor such acknowledgment. In this perspective, God is after all sovereign
over all spheres of life, public as well as private. Indeed, it is precisely
because God has so ordained that the public sphere is to be kept "secular"
(in the sense of being independent of church, or of truths known only
through revelation): but that stance need not be inconsistent with public
acknowledgment of the divine sovereignty that ordains and sustains this
separationist arrangement.54
52. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); STEVEN D.
SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM (1995); GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987).
53. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3-19
(2003); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
54. But cf. POWELL, supra note 4 at 9. ("[Pirofessions of carefully 'nonsectarian' religious belief
that permeate American government-the national motto 'In God We Trust,' the prayer at the opening
of the legislature, the 'God bless you' at the end of the official speech-ought to provoke Christian
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At least some tame religionists may also incline to support, or at least
to acquiesce in, symbolic or merely verbal recognitions of deity. Even if for
many practical purposes these people behave much like agnostics, they do
believe in God, and, as noted, many of them may intermittently aspire to
greater religiosity. Symbolic or expressive gestures are often a way to ac-
commodate the tension between one's principles and one's practice, or per-
haps between conflicting principles that one has not managed to reconcile:
so tame religionists may support some symbolic public acknowledgments of
God (such as "under God" in the Pledge or "In God We Trust" on the
currency) even though they might resist any more active or coercive de-
ployment of religion in politics.
Finally, even those without any serious religious belief but for whom
theism holds little existential urgency may see little harm in traditional and
innocuous expressions of religiosity. In principle, these complacent, ur-
bane, New York Times secularists may think, such expressions are probably
unconstitutional; but the offense is de minimis, and since there seem to be
strong believers who care passionately about such things, why not humor
them?
55
But this somewhat unsteady consensus in favor of permitting tradi-
tional religious expressions also excludes some citizens-most obviously
the agnostics and atheists for whom theism has significant existential ur-
gency (in a negative direction). In addition, since prevailing constitutional
doctrine contains no official de minimis exception, legal proponents of per-
mitting such expressions often find themselves in the awkward position of
offering contrived accounts which deny that in context these expressions
have religious content. Such explanations, of which Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in the Pledge of Allegiance case is perhaps the most
egregious example,56 demean the expressions and insult the intelligence,57
and this embarrassment may lead many who have no particular objection
to the expressions in themselves to oppose them nonetheless as a matter of
principle.
outrage.... Christians should view them as objectionable, an attempt to manipulate public sentiment
that is as cynical as it is essentially blasphemous.").
55. This seemed to be what we might call the New York Times response to the controversy over
"under God" in the Pledge. See also MEACHAM, supra note 12 at 239-40; Douglas Laycock, Equal
Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1986) (suggesting that the names of cities like Los Angeles and Corpus Christi are unconsti-
tutional in principle, but hoping no one will be so churlish as to bring the lawsuits to compel
invalidation).
56. See Elk Grove School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 (2U04) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
57. See Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Relig-
ious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 235 (2004) (ob-
serving that "t]his rationale is unconvincing both to serious nonbelievers and to serious believers");
Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralstic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 9, 70-71
(2004) (observing that "a pledge identifying the United States as subject to divine authority is asserting
the existence and authority of the divine" and adding that "pretending [that this and similar expres-
sions] are not religious is simply insulting").
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So given the nature of the cultural divide, it is not surprising that con-
troversies over symbols and expressions have moved to center stage to be-
come among the most heated (and often unseemly) disputes. And so long
as the nobly-intended but ill-conceived "no endorsement" test 58 remains
part of constitutional doctrine, I do not see any remedy for this situation.
III. CONCLUSION
Reflecting on the underlying presuppositions that divide us, as Profes-
sor Modak-Truran's prospectus asks us to do, may lead to a better under-
standing of the controversies that arise (with increasing frequency and
intensity, it seems) around the country. But will such understanding have
any practical benefit for actually resolving such controversies, or healing
the divisions? It would be nice to think so, and on some days I myself
believe in this prospect. But on others days the proposition looks more
doubtful.
On sunny days, it seems that a better understanding of underlying,
presuppositional differences might foster greater respect between compet-
ing camps. In academic and high-toned publications (including Supreme
Court opinions59), strong religion in this country is typically presented in
condescending and contemptuous caricatures-and strong religionists
often return the abuse. But it seems that we ought to be able to respect
people whom we acknowledge to be acting on sincerely held convictions,
even if we disagree with those convictions. Moreover, it seems to me that
people on both the secular and the strong religion side of the cultural di-
vide, even while emphatically disagreeing with the worldview of the other,
ought to be able to acknowledge that both worldviews are the legacy of
long, honorable, and impressive intellectual and cultural traditions.6" We
ought to be able to concede that each of these traditions possesses, if not
truth, then surely at least a certain plausibility from a certain point of view.
And each has produced admirable achievements: we owe much that we
value in American life today to traditions originating both in Jerusalem and
in Athens.
On gloomier days, though, it seems that getting clear about underlying
presuppositions may only serve to highlight the fact that there is a crucial
and deep-seated opposition in worldviews, or in worlds, that divides Amer-
icans. One sometimes sees good-hearted but fuzzy work-a recent popular
book by Jon Meacham6 is a good example, I think suggesting that our
58. See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987).
59. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (offering a conspicuous example of
such ridicule).
60. To be sure, whether current versions are faithful heirs to or departures from the underlying
traditions is always open to debate. Whether "fundamentalism" is in fact faithful to traditional or
orthodox Christianity is often questioned. Conversely, for my doubts about contemporary vestiges of
"the Enlightenment," see Steven D. Smith, Recovering (from) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REV.
1263 (2004).
61. See MEACHAM, supra note 12.
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differences have been blown out of proportion (a result of misunderstand-
ing, perhaps), and that if we would just try a little harder to understand and
be nice to each other we ought to be able to get along harmoniously. It
would be reassuring if this were so, and I like to think there is a measure of
truth in this view. But the more we look at underlying presuppositional
differences, the more difficult to negotiate some of those differences may
come to seem.
Nor is there is anything new in this situation: though sometimes de-
scribed by his devotees as the "Prince of Peace," Jesus soberly informed his
followers that he came not to bring peace but rather a sword of division.
6
1
So it is no accident, I think, that the leading modern strategies of concilia-
tion, Rawlsian "public reason," or the constitutional jurisprudence center-
ing on notions such as "equality" or "neutrality" whose principal virtue is a
capacity to promote equivocation and obfuscation, have attempted not to
understand our underlying comprehensive views and bring them into the
light, as we are doing here, but rather to submerge and suppress them and
to marginalize those who will not go along.63
Still, even if the worldviews in play are fundamentally opposed, it does
not necessarily follow that these differences must manifest themselves in
destructive conflict. It may be that the cultures of secularism and of strong
religion have within themselves the resources to instill tolerance, respect,
and (who knows?), possibly even love for those who are differently-
minded. Rather than attempting to suppress the most fundamental
(though divergent) convictions that make us who we are, I would hold to
that as our best hope. In the very long run, it may be that everyone will
become some sort of Unitarian, as Jefferson at one point predicted,64 or
that every knee shall bend, as Christians maintain,65 and so our fundamen-
tal divide will be healed. But in the meantime, I think our best bet is to
cultivate a respectful though not dishonest or intellectually soft toleration
among fundamentally different worldviews.66
62. Matthew 10:34-36.
63. See Smith, supra note 61.
64. See HOLMES, supra note 32 at 88.
65. Phillipians 2:9-11.
66. See Smith, supra note 43.
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